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CIVIC VIRTUE AND THE LIMITS OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM
Christopher L. Eisgruber*
I.
Scholars have occasionally suggested that if the Supreme Court
were to interpret the Constitution differently, American civil society
would be richer and American citizens would be more virtuous. Some
of these scholars blame judicial review in general, while others
complain about the substance of Supreme Court doctrine. The first
group includes, among others, Mary Ann Glendon and Michael
Sandel, who contend that the Court's concern with individual rights
has harmed American political culture. According to Glendon and
Sandel, judicial enforcement of individual rights has rendered
Americans less deliberative, less concerned with one another's well-
being, and less likely to live well.' The second group of scholars
includes Stephen Carter, who believes that the Supreme Court's
religious liberty jurisprudence has produced a culture that trivializes
religion, and Ronald Dworkin and Burt Neuborne, who maintain that
* Faculty Fellow, Program in Law and Public Affairs, Princeton University;, Professor
of Law, New York University School of Law. I would like to thank the other
Conference participants for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I am
especially grateful to Sotirios Barber for his thoughtful comment on my article, I have
tried to answer some of his specific concerns in the footnotes. Finally, I wish to
acknowledge the generous financial support provided to this research by the Max E.
and Filomen D'Agostino Greenberg Research Fund at the New York University
School of Law.
1. See generally Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of
Political Discourse (1991); Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in
Search of a Public Philosophy (1996). Glendon contends that "a gradual evolution in
the role of courts" has "propelled" American political discourse to take the form of
what she calls "rights talk." Glendon, supra, at 4. She blames this development for a
remarkable range of political maladies. "[R]ights talk," according to Glendon,
"promotes unrealistic expectations, heightens social conflict, [ ] inhibits dialogue that
might lead toward consensus, accommodation, or... the discovery of common
ground... [and] undermines the principal seedbeds of civic and personal virtue." Id.
at 14. Sandel says that "constitutional discourse has come to define the terms of
political discourse in American public life." Sandel, supra, at 108. According to
Sandel, the Supreme Court presides over a misguided quest to "banish moral and
religious argument from the public realm," and that quest is "impoverishing political
discourse and eroding the moral and civic resources necessary to self-government."
Id. at 23.
2. See generally Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief: How American
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the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo3 has done dramatic
damage to the quality and depth of American political debate.'
In this article, I suggest that all of these theories exaggerate the
capacity of free democratic institutions to form virtuous citizens and
good societies. My critique emphasizes two basic points. First, I
argue that in a free nation, the laws must give citizens liberty enough
to waste their lives and to govern themselves poorly. For that reason,
whether or not a democratic community lives virtuously will likely
depend on historical circumstances (such as economic crises and
military conflicts) and on the quality of its leaders and teachers; a
nation's laws and constitution will have relatively little power to
influence how people use their freedom. Second, I argue that
democratic constitutions in large nations have an inevitable tendency
to reduce citizens to "voters" and "taxpayers." As discussed in Part
III, the office of "voter" carries with it a particular set of incentives
that are damaging to civic virtue, and those incentives are exacerbated
when "voters" think of themselves as "taxpayers." The reduction of
citizens to voters and taxpayers restricts how much civic engagement
one can reasonably expect from a democratic society. I conclude that
some of the people who criticize Supreme Court doctrine in the name
of civic virtue are not only picking on the wrong institution, but also
asking for too much.
These arguments are provoked by criticisms of the American
Supreme Court, but neither of them is special to the American system
or to judicial review. We might frame the general point this way: in
any democratic constitutional system, there will be powerful limits on
the capacity of legal rules, norms, and institutions to improve the
quality of civil society. Of course, recognizing such limits does not
require us to deny that there is an important relationship between
constitutional interpretation and the good society.5 Toward the end of
this article, I consider some of the forms that connection might take.
Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion (1993).
3. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
4. Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 351-
52,369-70 (2000); Burt Neuborne, Buckley's Analytical Flaws, 6 J.L. & Pol'y 111, 115
(1997).
5. In his comment on this article, Sotirios Barber says that he is unsure about
whether I take "a positive view, or a welfarist view of the Constitution, as opposed to
either a negative or a proceduralist view of the Constitution." Sotirios A. Barber, On
Professor Eisgruber's View of the Constitution and the Good Society, 69 Fordham L.
Rev., 2151, 2151 (2001). He is also unsure about whether I believe that "constitution-
making and maintenance can be separated from the concern for virtue and the good
society." Id. at 2156. I wonder whether these ambiguities might be more of Barber's
making than of mine, but in any event let me state for the record that I accept what
Barber calls "a positive or welfarist view of the Constitution." I also agree with him
that constitution-making and maintenance cannot be separated from concern about
virtue and the good society. What I argue in this paper is, first, that there are limits
(rather severe limits, I think) to the kind of virtue and the kind of good society that
constitutionalists may reasonably hope to achieve, and second, that many
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II.
There is a long and venerable pedigree to the idea that constitutions
shape the character of citizens who live under them.' I have no
quarrel with that general proposition. On the contrary, in Part III of
this article, I argue that one essential feature of large democracies-
namely, the practice of national elections-has a damaging effect on
how citizens think about themselves. There are also happier stories to
be told about the influence of democratic constitutionalism on citizen
character. For example, rights of religious freedom presuppose that it
is good for citizens to respect people of different faiths. A
constitution that contains such rights does not force citizens to be
religiously tolerant-on the contrary, intolerant sects will enjoy the
same legal rights as do their competitors. Nevertheless, the
constitution will encourage tolerance, and intolerant faiths are likely
to become unpopular because they offend value judgments embodied
in the law.
Yet, Glendon, Sandel, and others who criticize Supreme Court
doctrine in the name of civic virtue need to draw a very strong
connection between constitutional interpretation and the good
society. They suppose not only that citizens are shaped by the basic
features of democratic constitutions in general (such as the practice of
voting or the principle of religious freedom), but also that citizen
character can be fine-tuned and elevated on the basis of contested
choices within the democratic paradigm-choices, for example, about
the extent to which judges should enforce rights or about the details of
Free Exercise and Establishment Clause doctrine.
It is a mistake to hope that constitutional choices could improve
civic virtue so dramatically. The problem is that in order to respect
basic and relatively uncontroversial principles of liberty, a nation's
laws must give people a tremendous amount of freedom to behave
badly. For that reason, constitutional norms and institutions cannot
themselves induce a community to live well. Moreover, any good
constitution will stand in the way of most laws that are designed
(effectively or not) to make citizens virtuous.
I do not mean to suggest that the government must be indifferent
about whether people pursue virtue-on the contrary, the government
can, and should, take stands in favor of virtue and against intolerance,
laziness, materialism, and selfishness, to say nothing of violence and
criminality. Nor do I wish merely to call attention to the fact that
people quite reasonably disagree about what counts as virtue,
constitutional theorists have been insufficiently attentive to those limits.
6. An excellent short treatment of the influence constitutions exert on citizen
character is found in Martin Diamond, Ethics and Politics: The American Way, in The
Moral Foundations of the American Republic 75-108 (Robert H. Horwitz ed., 3d ed.
1986).
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although that is getting closer to the mark. I want instead to insist
upon two more affirmative points: first, that there are many ways to
live a good life, and, second, that it is important that individuals
should be free to live whichever such way of life most appeals to
them. 7  These widely accepted propositions have a crucial
consequence. If we recognize that there are diverse ways to live well,
we will be able to protect the pursuit of those ways only by
establishing rights so broad that they will also protect some unethical
behavior. Put the other way around, if we tinker with constitutional
rights so that government can effectively discourage people from
living badly, we will inevitably trample on a freedom that we should
value highly: the freedom to act upon one's own, personal convictions
about how (not whether) to pursue the good life.'
Michael Sandel obscures this point in his book Democracy's
Discontent, where he suggests that the American political system is
unable to promote civic virtue only because it has been guided by a
mistaken obsession with moral neutrality. Sandel complains in
particular about Supreme Court doctrine, which in his view
presupposes that "it is illegitimate to base laws on judgments about
morality and immorality, because to do so violates the principle that
government should be neutral among ends." 9  Sandel is right to
contend that neutrality is an incoherent goal for a political system and
that the pursuit of neutrality would be a dispiriting foundation for
public life. Sandel is wrong, however, to suggest that constitutional
doctrine insists upon moral neutrality. American law is, for example,
not neutral about whether a racist life is a good one; on the contrary,
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
condemns racism, and it does so on moral grounds. Sandel falls into
error because he repeatedly conflates two distinct propositions. He
says that under American law, the "government may not impose a
particular conception of the good life,"' 0 which is true, and he says
that under American law, the "government [must] be neutral on the
question of the good life," which is false." Supreme Court doctrine
rightly reflects an attitude toward ethics which is pluralist, not neutral.
7. Sotirios Barber seems to interpret this sentence to mean that people should be
free to live any life that appeals to them. Barber, supra note 5, at 2154-55. He then
goes on to prove (without much difficulty) that I cannot really be serious about this
proposition, since I do not believe that people should be free to pursue lives that are
violent and racist. But I never say that people should be free to live any life that
might appeal to them; what I say is that there are many good lives, and people should
be free to decide which "such life"-that is, which of the many lives that are truly
good-they will live.
8. This justification for liberal political rights has been elaborated by Joseph Raz.
See, e.g., Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 418-19 (1986).
9. Sandel, supra note 1, at 76.
10. Id. at 54.
11. Id. at 55. Sandel makes a related mistake by confusing the truthful claim that
constitutional doctrine requires "[g]overnment... to respect the capacity of persons
[Vol. 692134
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For example, one need not hold any particular religious convictions
in order to live a good life. There are important ethical differences
among (for example) atheism, Islam, Judaism, and Christianity, but it
is possible to live well while subscribing to any of these philosophies
and traditions. A good constitution must therefore include very broad
principles of religious freedom. On the other hand, the government
has no obligation to be neutral on all questions about religious ethics
(e.g., "Which is better-Christianity or Satanism?"). Somebody who
wants to practice a religion that recommends intolerance or violence
should find the law obstructing his path at every turn. Nevertheless, a
good constitution will permit people to espouse religious doctrines
that recommend hatred, violence, and inhumane discrimination. That
is partly because the freedom to do what one wants, or to make
choices, is valuable for its own sake.12 But it is also because there is no
way to formulate any principle or design any institution which could
be trusted to draw reliable distinctions between good and bad
religions. A broad right of religious liberty is the only satisfactory
means for respecting the great diversity of good lives that a diverse
people might reasonably desire to lead.
Or consider television. Robert Putnam casts television as one of
the principal villains in his story about the decline of American civic
engagement. 13  Even if Putnam overstates his case, 4 he presents
strong evidence that television-watching not only has had a bad effect
on American society, but also has made people unhappy.15 Surely,
one might think, it would be legitimate and desirable for the
government to craft policies designed to preclude Americans from
to choose their values and relationships for themselves," with the false claim that
constitutional doctrine presupposes that "what matters above all ... is not the ends
we choose but our capacity to choose them." Id. at 12, 92. Constitutional doctrine
rightly values the freedom to make choices about matters of moral and ethical
importance, but it does not follow that it values only the capacity for choice, much less
that it treats all choices as equally good.
12. Sandel tends to characterize Supreme Court doctrine as concerned with
"making choices" rather than with "doing what one wants"; as a result, he can
criticize the Court for assuming, implausibly, that basic commitments and values are
"chosen" rather than, say, "held," "discovered," "recognized," or "accepted." See,
e.g., id. at 118 ("[Tlhe freely choosing, autonomous self has come to prevail in
constitutional law just at the time it has faded as a plausible self-image in contract law,
and in economic life generally."). Sandel's distinction is a red-herring: even if values
are "discovered" or simply "held" rather than "chosen," constitutions should put
some value on the freedom of people to do what they want (within limits, of course)
rather than what the polity deems virtuous.
13. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American
Community 221-46 (2000).
14. Margaret Talbot, in her review of Bowling Alone, plausibly suggests that
Putnam assigns too much blame to television. Margaret Talbot, lVio Wants to Be a
Legionnaire?, N.Y. Times, June 25,2000, § 7 (Book Review), at 11.
15. Watching television is positively correlated with headaches, stomachaches,
and insomnia. Putnam, supra note 13, at 240-41.
2135
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
becoming "couch potatoes."' 6  Yet, it would be hard for the
government to do that without violating basic principles of free
speech. That is not because the government has some obligation to
pretend that "being a couch potato" is a plausible conception of the
good life, but rather because television is an important medium for
the dissemination of information, opinions, art, and social
commentary (and some of that commentary is embedded in shows
such as Saturday Night Live, Murphy Brown, The Simpsons, and Buffy
the Vampire Slayer, which are likely targets for William Bennett, Dan
Quayle, Joseph Lieberman, and other self-appointed guardians of
national morality). Television-watching may feed the stupor of couch
potatoes, but it may also be an ingredient in many versions of the
good life. It is hard to imagine how the government could prevent
people from becoming couch potatoes without at the same time
preventing them from becoming, for example, newshounds.'7
In sum, good constitutions (and, more broadly, good democracies)
must take a pluralist attitude toward ethical questions. They must
recognize that there is a wide variety of ways to live well. For that
reason, any good constitution will define rights broadly enough that
people will have the freedom to live badly (else they would not have
the freedom to live well). If America suffers from an ethical malaise,
we should not assume that we can cure it by tinkering with its laws.
Public opinion is an independent variable in politics. Neither the
Constitution nor the nation's ordinary law can control it-and, in the
16. In the draft of this paper which I presented orally at the Conference on the
Constitution and the Good Society, I made a less precise claim: namely, that it would
be hard for the government to "reduce the number of... 'couch potatoes'.. . without
violating principles of free speech." In response, Sotirios Barber and others correctly
pointed out that the government could pursue that goal by funding schools, the arts,
and the sciences. Barber, supra note 5, at 2155 n.25. There is, of course, a difficult
empirical question about the impact of any such scheme: funding the sciences, for
example, might produce better, more seductive televisions rather than an
intellectually active citizenry. Still, as I say at the end of this article, it seems
undeniable that the government can improve civic culture by increasing certain kinds
of public expenditures, especially those related to education. See infra text
accompanying note 55. But none of that is inconsistent with my basic point: the
government will still have to give people the freedom to live badly. Even if the
government can reduce the number of American couch potatoes, it cannot preclude
people from becoming couch potatoes: the government can spend money to educate
people, but it will also have to give educated citizens the freedom to spend their hours
lounging in front of television sets. And many Americans, blessed with a decent (if
not good) education and publicly-funded recreational opportunities, choose to do just
that.
17. Putnam claims that watching TV news, unlike watching TV entertainment, has
positive correlations with civic engagement: "TV news viewing is positively associated
with civic involvement. Those of us who rely solely on TV news are not quite as civic
in our behavior as our fellow citizens who rely on newspapers, but we news watchers
are nevertheless more civic than most other Americans." Putnam, supra note 13, at
220.
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long run, it will control them.18 Public opinion will evolve in response
to all sorts of factors, including human nature, historical accident,
patterns of immigration, and leadership." Of course, immigration and
leadership, unlike human nature or historical accident, may be subject
to constitutional guidance; we shall return to that possibility in Part
IV.
III.
Good constitutions must give citizens freedom to live badly, but, as
we have already seen, constitutions can provide citizens with some
modest incentives to use their freedom well. Thus, for example, laws
and institutions that uphold religious freedom will encourage citizens
to be tolerant of other religious faiths. Modest incentives of this kind
are entirely consistent with the argument of the preceding part. We
might hope that a well-formed democratic government would be rich
with incentives for good behavior, either in the constitution itself or in
ordinary law. Or we might hope that insofar as the nation needs
leaders, the Supreme Court and the other national institutions
charged with interpreting the Constitution could be counted on to
supply that leadership.
Unfortunately, there are features basic to any democratic
constitution that are likely to provide citizens with incentives of
exactly the wrong kind-incentives that lead them to be selfish and
lazy rather than public-spirited and active. Ironically, large
democracies will inevitably have an aristocratic or oligarchic element:
very few citizens will be able to serve as public officials or to achieve
prominence in national political debate. Most citizens will exercise
formal political responsibility only through two very limited roles,
those of "voter" and "taxpayer." Indeed, on the occasions when
ordinary citizens speak out in public fora or write letters to their
representatives, they often brandish these roles to certify their
political authority-as in, "I want you to know that I am a taxpayer!"
or "You should listen to the people who vote!"
Critics of judicial review rarely worry about the reduction of
citizenship to voting and taxpaying. On the contrary, they tacitly
18. "In this and like communities, public sentiment is everything. With public
sentiment, nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed." The Ottowa Debate,
reprinted in Created Equal? The Complete Lincoln-Douglas Debates of 1858, at 128
(Paul M. Angle ed., 1958) (Abraham Lincoln, Reply to Stephen Douglas at Ottawa,
Illinois (Aug. 21, 1858)).
19. Cf. Joseph Cropsey, The United States as Regime and the Sources of the
American Way of Life, in Horwitz, supra note 6, at 165, 166-67 ("[While the coercive
fragment of the political fraction can be thought of as under our deliberate control
through suffrages and process of known law, every other element of the regime is
subject to ongoing thought, which, in its political effect, if not in its origin, has so
much in common with chance that we may for the moment count the two as
equivalent.").
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equate "the electorate" with "the people," and they assume that
judicial review is problematic precisely because it transfers power
from voters to unelected judges. But it is an error to identify "voters"
with "citizens" or "the electorate" with "the people." "Voter" is a
political office, and, like other political offices, it carries with it a set of
incentives that affect the behavior of those who occupy it. The key
features of voting in a large nation are these: voters act in secret; they
are not obliged to give reasons for their vote; they choose among a
very limited set of options (such as two or three candidates for
political office, or "yes" or "no" to a ballot proposition); and each
voter's individual ballot has almost zero weight in determining the
outcome of an election. Under these circumstances, each voter can be
sure that her ballot will have no impact upon either her own
reputation or the nation's policy. Voters therefore have an incentive
to dismiss political deliberation and research as a waste of time-
indeed, they have an incentive to regard voting itself as a waste of
time (and, of course, turn-out for American elections is notoriously
low). Moreover, because voters need not defend their vote in public,
they have an incentive to act on the basis of self-interest or partisan
ideology. We therefore expect voters to "vote their pocketbooks" or
to cast their ballots on the basis of their personal answer to such
questions as, "Are you better off today than you were four years
ago?"
The best analyses of American democracy have recognized that
electoral politics may actually discourage vigorous citizenship.
Benjamin Barber, for example, argues that "[e]lectoral activity
reduces citizens to alienated spectators-at best, watchdogs with
residual and wholly passive functions of securing the accountability of
those to whom they have turned over their sovereignty."2 Robert
Putnam describes "[v]oting and following politics" as "relatively
undemanding forms of participation" in which citizens behave like
"fans" who stay "in their seats, following the action and chatting
about the antics of the star players."'" Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman,
and Henry Brady report that the "nationalization and
professionalization" of American politics "have redefined the role of
citizen activist as, increasingly, a writer of checks and letters. 22
When Verba and his colleagues describe citizens as "writers of
checks," they have in mind voluntary contributions to political
campaigns and interest groups, but the phrase is equally apt to the
citizen's second major formal role in national democracy, that of
20. Benjamin R. Barber, Neither Leaders Nor Followers: Citizenship Under Strong
Democracy, in A Passion for Democracy: American Essays 95, 98 (1998).
21. Putnam, supra note 13, at 37.
22. Sidney Verba et al., Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American
Politics 73 (1995); see also Putnam, supra note 13, at 159-64 (describing the rise of
professionalized interest group politics in which citizens are "fans" not "players").
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"taxpayer." Like "voter," "taxpayer" carries with it a distinctive set of
incentives; the incentives of taxpayers are substantially different from,
but no less corrupting to the public spirit than, those of voters.
Whereas voting is optional and relatively costless, taxpaying is
mandatory and burdensome. Voters exercise infinitesimal amounts of
policy-making power; taxpayers exercise no power and must comply
with instructions specified by others. "Taxpayer" places the citizen in
a position that is simultaneously subordinate and adversarial to her
government; whereas voting inspires passivity, taxpaying inspires
resentment. There is an understandable tendency for citizens to
regard the two roles as flip sides of one another: taxing is what the
government does to us, and voting is what we do to stop it (or to get
our money's worth, which amounts to much the same thing).
During peacetime, "voter" and "taxpayer" are the two principal
roles through which citizens will participate in their government.
Matters are different, of course, if the nation is fighting a war. Under
those circumstances, the most visible facet of citizenship will be
neither voting nor paying taxes but military service. If the people are
not firmly behind the war effort, citizens may regard military service
as an especially onerous form of taxation. If, however, the people
support the war, opportunities for heroism by ordinary citizens will be
relatively numerous (at least if one is disposed to regard risking
horrible death as "an opportunity for heroism"), and many families
will endure tremendous hardships and make extreme sacrifices for the
public good.' This experience will profoundly influence the way
people conceive of citizenship.24 It may also provide leaders with
unique opportunities to influence the development of society, for
people will want them to interpret the country's struggle in a way that
makes the pain and bloodshed meaningful-triumphal rather than
merely catastrophic. 5  Indeed, it is possible that efficacious moral
23. Some commentators who envy the solidarity and civic-mindedness sometimes
produced by wartime citizenship have suggested that something similar might be
achieved in peacetime through a compulsory "national service" program in which
young people would be forced to render public service of one kind or another. See,
eg., Philip Selznick, The Idea of a Communitarian Morality, 75 Cal. L Rev. 445, 456
(1987) (endorsing such a plan). Such proposals overlook the need for public support.
A crucial feature of the political context for military service in World War II was that
most Americans felt themselves united by "shared adversity and a shared enemy."
Putnam, supra note 13, at 268, 270-71. That is not true of every war, for example, it
was not "repeated in the 1950s in Korea or in the 1960s in Vietnam." Id. at 272. Nor
is there any shared sense of crisis in the United States now. On the contrary, the
proposed "national service" programs would be created not to meet an external
threat to the national community, but because policy-makers feel that America's
young people are too foolish to be trusted with control of their own lives. Under
these circumstances, a mandatory "national service" program likely would be
experienced principally (although by no means exclusively) as a form of taxation.
24. Putnam describes the profound, and for the most part salutary, effects of
World War II on American civil society. See Putnam, supra note 13, at 267-72.
25. The best American example of such leadership is the Gettysburg Address,
2001] 2139
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leadership in a large nation like the United States will be almost
impossible when the country is not at war or facing some other dire
crisis.26
In light of the limited roles played by democratic citizens in large
nation-states, especially during peacetime but even during wartime, it
seems almost disingenuous for Jeremy Waldron and other critics of
judicial review to complain that it reduces public deliberation to an
"impotent" "debating exercise" in which a "star-struck people may
speculate about what the Supreme Court will do next. '27 It is true, of
course, that most citizens have no power to alter Supreme Court
jurisprudence. But most citizens have no power to alter the outcome
of elections, either. In large nations, policy-making is inevitably a
professional activity carried out by elites. There is no other way for
the government to operate. In a nation of more than 200 million
people (or even in cities and states with millions of people), most
people will never get a turn on the public stage-to say nothing of
regular, continuing influence over public policy.'
Under these circumstances, constitutional adjudication may actually
be preferable to electoral politics from the standpoint of democratic
flourishing. Citizens will be spectators in either case, but at least in
the case of constitutional adjudication they will be spectators to an
argument about moral and political principle, rather than to an
interest group deal.29 I do not want to make too much of that point.
Whether or not the impact of judicial review on democratic
where Lincoln self-consciously revised the meaning of the Civil War and, with it, the
American nation. See generally Garry Wills, Lincoln at Gettysburg: The Words that
Remade America (1992). The point applies more generally, however; thus World
War II helped to launch an extended period of civic engagement in the United States
because "most Americans in 1945 felt that the war had been a just one and that their
terrible collective sacrifice-all those sons and daughters who would not come
home- had been in some measure vindicated by victory." Putnam, supra note 13, at
271-72.
26. If so, that is not a good reason to wish for war, which is genuinely horrible, but
yet another reason not to expect much from democratic citizens. Putnam
acknowledges this point: "Creating (or re-creating) social capital is no simple task. It
would be eased by a palpable national crisis, like war or depression or natural
disaster, but for better and for worse, America at the dawn of the new century faces
no such galvanizing crisis." Putnam, supra note 13, at 402. Alan Ryan, in his review of
Putnam's book, underscores it. Alan Ryan, My Way, N.Y. Rev. of Books 47, 50 (Aug.
10, 2000).
27. Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement 291 (1999).
28. There is, accordingly, an unrecognized irony in the title of the 1998 report of
the National Commission on Civic Renewal, A Nation of Spectators: How Civic
Disengagement Weakens America and What We Can Do About It, available at
http://www.puaf.umd.edu/civicrenewal (last updated Sept. 27, 1999). The Commission
intends A Nation of Spectators to describe a contingent, and changeable, feature of
American politics; the title may instead capture a basic structural feature of large-
scale democratic politics which renders the Commission's entire project quixotic.
29. T elaborate this point in Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-
Government (Harvard Univ. Press forthcoming 2001) (ch. 3, on file with author).
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citizenship is beneficial, it is certain to be marginal by comparison to
the impact of voting and paying taxes. In large nation-states during
peacetime, most citizens will exercise formal political responsibility
only as voters and taxpayers, and those roles will influence their
conception of citizenship. Education and leadership may mitigate that
tendency, but the tendency will in turn limit what teachers and leaders
can reasonably hope to achieve.
That observation seems especially relevant to some of the
extravagant claims made by critics of Buckley. Proponents of
campaign finance reform occasionally contend that if Buckley were
overturned and campaign spending were limited, America would
enjoy a kind of political renaissance-political discussion would be
better and deeper, and citizens would turn to public life with fresh
enthusiasm. Thus, for example, my colleague Burt Neuborne says
that "Buckley and the rules it fostered are responsible for much of
what is wrong with our current political structure."' He blames
Buckley for, among other things, creating a world in which "voter
turnout is plummeting" and that is "without new political ideas and
almost bereft of serious political debate. '3
Whether or not Buckley was rightly decided,3 2 it is implausible to
think that Buckley's repeal could have such dramatic effects on the
quality of public deliberation.3 3 If Americans wanted more serious
discussion, they could easily get it. They could subscribe to the New
York Times or the Wall Street Journal; they could read The New
Republic or Foreign Affairs; they could watch Newshour with Jim
Lehrer or tune their car radios to National Public Radio. They do
not-not because Buckley or campaign ads prevent them from doing
so, but because they do not want to. That choice is relatively easy to
understand in terms of the incentives that operate on voters: in a
large nation, each voter's ballot is effectively meaningless, and voters
accordingly have no incentive to invest time to researching their
choices.
These effects may be even more dramatic if we focus on the "swing
voters" who are likely to decide any election. According to Kathleen
Hall Jamieson, "[i]t is axiomatic among campaign professionals that
30. Neuborne, supra note 4, at 115.
31. Id. at 112-13.
32. There is more to be said on behalf of the decision than its liberal critics usually
admit. See, eg., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 663 (1997) (defending the core principles of Buckley).
33. It is an entirely different question whether overturning Buckley would affect
the distribution of power within American politics-e.g., by transferring power from
moneyed interests to those that are best equipped for grass-roots organizing, such as
evangelical churches. See Putnam, supra note 13, at 162 (noting that "unlike [with]
other newly mobilized groups, such as environmentalists, firm and enduring
organizational foundations for the politicization of the evangelical community already
existed").
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presidential races involve a 40-40-20 equation: Forty percent of the
people will always vote for your party, 40 percent will never vote for
your party, and the remaining 20 percent are up for grabs."'  If so, a
rational presidential candidate should have two objectives: ensuring
high voter turn-out among the 40 percent who are favorable, and
winning over the 20 percent who are up for grabs. Political campaigns
will therefore be guided in significant part by the interests and
political sophistication of the undecided 20 percent. Now what do we
think that 20 percent looks like? In particular, if voters in general
have few incentives to invest time in politics, do we think that the
undecided 20 percent is likely to consist of the most knowledgeable
voters, the least knowledgeable, or a random slice of the electorate?
I do not know whether there is empirical research to answer that
question.35 I am sure that there are some very thoughtful citizens who
are "swing voters." I am astonished, however, by some of the things
that seem to produce shifts from one candidate to another. So, for
example, after the Republican Party Convention in July 2000, George
W. Bush's support swelled to 54 percent of likely voters, up 9 percent
from where it stood two weeks earlier.36 When Al Gore selected
Joseph Lieberman as his running mate two weeks later, Bush's share
of registered voters dropped to 45 percent.37 According to USA
Today/CNN/Gallup Polls, Bush's lead among registered voters
dropped (incredibly) from 19 percent to 2 percent in the space of
three days.38 Now, if these polls are accurate, there must be some
significant number of American adults who had been unsure about
how to vote but then saw the Republican Convention (at which
nothing much happened), and said, "Wow! That was impressive! I
think I'll vote for George Bush!" That would be amazing enough, but
it appears that some of these same people39 turned around after the
34. Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Everything You Think You Know About Politics...
And Why You're Wrong 5 (2000).
35. To do the relevant empirical work, researchers would have to find a reliable
way to identify accurately the pivotal twenty percent of the electorate. This group
presumably includes any voter who reports herself to be "undecided," but it would
also have to include any voter who reports herself firmly in the Gore camp, for
example, but who (whether she admits it or not) might later change her mind.
36. Richard Benedetto, Capitalizing on the Convention; Poll: GOP's Image
Reform is Working, USA Today, Aug. 7,2000, at 2A.
37. Laurence McQuillan, Gore Turns To Lieberman; First Jewish VP Pick Lifts
Dems' Standing in Poll, USA Today, Aug. 8,2000, at 1A.
38. Id. Note that the USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll immediately following the
Lieberman selection produced numbers for registered voters, whereas the post-
Convention poll distinguished between registered voters and likely voters and
produced numbers for both samples of the electorate. The "likely voters" numbers
are considered more reliable indicators of likely electoral outcomes, but since the
later of the two polls surveyed all registered voters, it is impossible to say how
dramatically the Lieberman selection altered Gore's momentary support among likely
voters.
39. I can't prove they were the same people, of course; it is possible that all the
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Lieberman selection and said, "Whoa! That's impressive, too! Now I
think I'll vote for Al Gore!" If candidates must aim to capture an
electorate that swings so wildly in such gentle political breezes, should
we be surprised that they become blowhards?
Moreover, at the same time that candidates are pursuing the most
capricious 20 percent of the population, newspaper publishers and
television broadcasters are trying to get the biggest possible audience
for their campaign coverage-and, by hypothesis, only 20 percent of
that potential audience is undecided, whereas 80 percent of it already
knows which candidate it will support. That means the news media
has a tremendous incentive to cover the campaign as a "horse race":
most of its audience wants information that will answer the question,
"Is my candidate doing the right things to win?" not the question,
"For whom should I vote?"''
That, of course, complicates the task of the candidates, who are
trying to reach the undecided 20 percent. It is possible that the
undecided segment of the population pays little attention, or no
attention, to the news;4 but even if undecided voters do pay attention,
they are likely to find the media covering the candidates' positions as
strategic moves, rather than as substantive policies. The candidates
must therefore find some way to cast their message so that it reaches
the undecided 20 percent even after being filtered by publications and
broadcasters whose interests are largely dictated by the committed 80
percent majority.
No doubt this analysis oversimplifies. Nor should we casually
assume that the current state of affairs is so bleak as its critics
sometimes allege-there is evidence, marshaled by Professor
Jamieson among others, that American political debate is more
substantive than people commonly suppose.4 2 Nevertheless, all of the
incentives I have just described arise rather directly from the existence
of national elections in a two-party system. Even if those incentives
are not quite as strong as I have implied, it seems implausible to think
that overturning Buckley or tinkering with Supreme Court
jurisprudence would have any substantial impact on the quality of
American political debate.
people who switched to Gore after the Lieberman announcement were voters who
had been undecided or who had supported Bush prior to the Republican Convention.
40. Jamieson and her colleagues present evidence that the media does indeed
cover campaign speeches as strategic ploys rather than substantive policy discussions.
Jamieson, supra note 34, at 13, 38-40. Jamieson criticizes this tendency and attributes
it to various self-serving motives on the part of journalists. Id. at 39. In my view,
however, it is also a rational response to the interests and needs of the audience for
campaign news-an audience that consists principally of people who want to know
who's winning, not for whom they should vote.
41. One of the more depressing statistics collected by Putnam (in a book filled
with depressing statistics) is that fewer than one in three Americans under the age of
forty reads a newspaper on a daily basis. Putnam, supra note 13, at 219.
42. See, e.g., Jamieson, supra note 34, at xiii, 8-10, 106,211-12.
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If one really wanted to alter the incentives facing American citizens,
one would have to consider reducing the professionalization of politics
in general-and that would mean, among other things, reducing the
extent to which policy-making was dependent upon national or
statewide elections. One would probably have to engage in
constitutional reform rather than (or in addition to) constitutional
interpretation. Benjamin Barber, who is exceptional in his unflinching
recognition of the hard choices that must be made to secure vigorous
democratic citizenship, has recommended some reforms designed to
renew citizen involvement in policy-making. He has suggested, for
example, the creation of a nationwide system of neighborhood citizen
assemblies and the use of lotteries, rather than elections, to fill some
local and regional political offices.43 I am, however, inclined to think
that such reforms are impractical (in the case of the neighborhood
assemblies) or undesirable (in the case of the lottery system) despite
their very real benefits from the standpoint of participation.
Whatever we think of our current political discourse, we may just
have to live with it. To paraphrase Winston Churchill: representative
democracy is a miserable form of government, and the only thing to
be said in its favor is that all the alternatives are worse.44
IV.
It is a mistake to hope that legal reform, constitutional design, or
constitutional interpretation can bring about a rich, deliberative civic
life in a large-scale modern democracy. Such hopes are bound to be
disappointed for two reasons: first, any good constitution must give
people substantial freedom to be bad, and second, any democratic
political system will give citizens incentives to be selfish and apathetic.
On the other hand, it would also be a mistake to suppose that law or
constitutional interpretation should be unconcerned with civic virtue.
In this part, I briefly consider three areas which are promising venues
for further research into connections between the Constitution and
the good society.
1. Citizenship and Leadership. Even if the Constitution exerted no
control over the trajectory of American culture, there would
nevertheless remain at least one connection between constitutional
interpretation and civic virtue. Constitutional citizens should ponder
how to use the freedom that the Constitution gives them, and leaders
should deliberate about how best to guide the people. Reflections of
this kind will not be matters of constitutional law-they will not be
43. Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age
267-73,290-93 (1984).
44. Winston Churchill said, "Democracy is the worst form of government except
all those other forms that have been tried from time to time." The International
Thesaurus of Quotations § 231(7), at 146 (1970) (quoting Sir Winston Churchill,
speech to the House of Commons (Nov. 1947)).
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enforceable by courts or, for that matter, by any other political
institution; they will owe whatever efficacy they have to the free
choices of citizens and leaders. But while the personal commitments
of citizens and leaders will not have the character of "law," they
should be informed by constitutional interpretation. What it means to
be a good citizen or a good leader in the United States will likely
differ from what it means to be a good citizen in, say, Canada or
Britain or France. To comprehend the responsibilities of citizens and
leaders in America, one will have to reflect upon, among other things,
American political institutions, and that will be an exercise in
constitutional interpretation.
2. Political Unity. We noticed earlier that some constitutional
norms (such as those that guarantee religious freedom) inculcate
certain virtues (such as religious tolerance) in American citizens.
Most of these norms can be justified without reference to civic virtue
or the good society. For example, most aspects of religious freedom
can be explained by their value to individual liberty or equality; the
production of religious toleration is a by-product of these norms,
rather than an essential part of their justification. A few norms,
however, might flow more directly from concerns about the good
society. An example is the principle that the government ought to
treat Americans as capable of flourishing together as a unified
political community, rather than as a conglomeration of separate and
perhaps antagonistic sub-groups. I have elsewhere suggested that this
principle of political unity is an essential component of Establishment
Clause and Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. 5 The principle
explains, for example, why the state of New York behaved
unconstitutionally when it created a separate school district for the
Satmar Hasidim in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School
District v. Grumet,6 even though the district was desired both by the
Hasidim and by their non-Hasidic neighbors. It is wrong for the
government to take actions that depend on the idea that Americans of
different faiths will live better if they live apart from one another.
3. New Americans: Immigrants and Children. Leadership and
political unity suggest links between the Constitution and the good
society, but neither will help those who want constitutional law to
make Americans less selfish. Are there any ways to do that? If
government must give citizens enough freedom that they can live
badly, then perhaps the government's best chance to govern social
development is by influencing who becomes a citizen. The United
45. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Ethnic Segregation by Religion and Race:
Reflections on Kiryas Joel and Shaw v. Reno, 26 Cumb. L Rev. 515 (1996);
Christopher L. Eisgruber, Political Unity and tie Powers of Government, 41 UCLA L
Rev. 1297 (1994); Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Constitutional Vahte of Assimilation,
96 Colum. L. Rev. 87 (1996).
46. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
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States replenishes its citizenry from two sources: immigrants who
come here and children who grow up here (the sources overlap, since
some children may grow up in the United States after immigrating
here with or without their families). For that reason, scholars
concerned with connections between constitutionalism and the good
society should pay special attention to immigration and to the family
and the schools, which are the two most obvious institutions through
which the American government shapes child development.
It is an open question to what extent the law in any of these areas
ought to be constitutional rather than statutory or administrative. It is
also an open question whether, insofar as the law is constitutionalized,
it might be more or less fully determined by considerations related to
individual liberty and equality, rather than to civic virtue and the good
society.47 I make no effort to resolve such questions in the brief
discussion that follows; for the time being, my only goal is to highlight
domains likely to reward attention from those who are interested in
specifying more fully the connections between constitutional
interpretation and the good society.
I begin with immigration law, which seems to me perhaps the most
important and least analyzed of these topics. There are three reasons
why immigration law seems an especially promising subject for further
research. First, immigration might affect the quality of American
society in ways that are profound, complex, and surprising. For
example, one might believe (and I am very tempted by this view) that
immigrants have an especially vigorous appreciation for the privileges
and responsibilities of American citizenship: because they are
Americans by choice rather than merely by accident of birth, and
because they have a concrete appreciation of what it means to be
without the benefits of American citizenship, they often have a special
commitment to the basic principles of democracy and a real
willingness to work hard (often in unappreciated jobs) to take
advantage of what American society has to offer. On the other hand,
it is also possible that the influx of huge numbers of persons who have
very different value systems and who do not speak English may make
it impossible to forge a national community. Finally, there is a real, if
awkward to acknowledge, possibility that immigrants from some
cultures may enrich civil society more than others. So, for example,
Robert Putnam's fascinating study of social capital in the United
States includes the astonishing claim that "[o]ne surprisingly strong
predictor of the degree of social capital in any [American] state in the
47. Linda McClain and James Fleming suggest that the best justifications for
reviving civil society will often relate "as much to securing what we call 'deliberative
autonomy'-enabling people to decide how to live their own lives-as to promoting
'deliberative democracy'-preparing them for participation in democratic life." Linda
C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Some Questions for Civil Society-Revivalists, 75 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 301,308 (2000).
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1990s is... the fraction of its population that is of Scandinavian
stock."'
Second, not only does immigration seem likely to influence the
trajectory of American society, but also immigration law seems likely
to have a real impact upon actual patterns of immigration in the
United States. I do not mean, of course, that immigration law can
control immigration entirely-after all, hundreds of thousands of
illegal immigrants enter the United States annually. 9 But I do believe
that if the United States changed its immigration quotas, or altered
the resources devoted to enforcing immigration laws, it could
substantially increase (and perhaps substantially decrease, although
that might be harder) the number of new Americans entering the
country each year. This observation may seem banal; people usually
assume that the law is capable of influencing behavior. I am much less
sure, however, that this crucial point will hold true when we turn, in
just a moment, to consider the family and education -in other words,
child development in America, unlike patterns of immigration, may be
driven principally by sociological forces too powerful for law to tame.
Third, immigration law poses thorny questions of principle that
have been too much neglected by constitutional theorists.' On the
one hand, it is possible that governments have much more discretion
about whom to admit than about how to treat people after they have
arrived-so that, for example, the government might be able to favor
immigration by Scandinavians on the ground that they are good for
social capital, even though that kind of ethnic discrimination would be
completely unacceptable in any other venue of government action.
The justification for this extraordinary discretion might have
something to do with basic, if ugly, facts about the inherent exclusivity
of any real community-an idea captured, if slightly sweetened, by
Michael Walzer's well-known suggestion that "[n]eighborhoods can
be open only if countries are at least potentially closed." t On the
48. Putnam, supra note 13, at 294.
49. Official estimates suggest that the number of illegal immigrants residing in the
United States increases by around 275,000 persons each year. See Illegal Alien
Resident Population, at httpJ/v.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutinsfstatistics/
illegalalienlindex.htm (last modified Dec. 20,2000).
50. Of course, not everybody has neglected the constitutional questions raised by
immigration law. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Strangers to the Constitution:
Immigrants, Borders, and Fundamental Law (1996); Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals:
Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (1997); T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1471 (1986); Linda S. Bosniak,
Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L Rev.
1047 (1994); Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law.
Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 Colum. L Rev. 1625
(1992); Peter J. Spiro, The Citizenship Dilemma, 51 Stan. L Rev. 597 (1999) (book
review). My own foray into the field is Christopher L Eisgruber, Birthright
Citizenship and the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 54 (1997).
51. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 38
(1983).
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other hand, it is extremely difficult to explain why a liberal regime
"dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal 5 2 should
be able to cast that principle aside when policing its borders. And
even if the government is entitled to have some discretion in
administering immigration law, it is not clear that discretion should be
so broad as constitutional doctrine currently allows.
By comparison to immigration, child-rearing has received a great
deal of attention from constitutionalists. 3 That should not be
surprising: children are "our own" in a way that immigrants are not,
and virtually everybody agrees that there are important constitutional
principles relevant to schools and the family. Since others have
written so much about these topics, I offer only a few mildly skeptical
reflections about the capacity of law to influence child development.
What is true of citizen behavior in general may also be true of
parenting and teaching in particular: the Constitution and the law
more generally may have little capacity to determine whether citizens
are good parents or good teachers. The government's conception of
the good in this domain, as in all others, must be pluralist: it will have
to respect multiple different conceptions of what it means to be a
good parent or good teacher, and it may be impossible for the
government to honor that pluralist ideal without at the same time
giving citizens the freedom to parent or teach badly. Now, of course,
the government's obligations to respect the freedom of parents and
teachers will be limited by its interest in protecting the well-being of
children, and that countervailing interest may authorize the
government to regulate citizen behavior toward children more
intrusively, and hence more effectively, than it can other forms of
citizen behavior. Cutting in the opposite direction, however, is
another, more purely practical consideration: it may be impossible for
the government to monitor effectively the crucial decisions of parents
and teachers. The government may prohibit child abuse (although
even doing that effectively is not easy) and prescribe reading lists for
schools, but it will not be able to ascertain, much less regulate, how
much time parents spend reading to their children, or what sort of
attitudes teachers convey when they are alone in their classrooms with
students. 4
52. Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in Wills, supra
note 25, at 263.
53. The literature is extensive; among the notable works are: Amy Gutmann,
Democratic Education (1987); Stephen Macedo, Diversity and Distrust: Civic
Education in a Multicultural Democracy (2000); Seedbeds of Virtue: Sources of
Competence, Character and Citizenship in American Society (Mary Ann Glendon &
David Blankenhorn eds., 1995); see also Linda C. McClain, The Domain of Civic
Virtue in a Good Society: Families, Schools, and Sex Equality, 69 Fordham L. Rev.
1617 (2001).
54. I pursue some implications of this point in Christopher L. Eisgruber, How do
Liberal Democracies Teach Values?, in Nomos XLIII: Moral and Political Education
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To some extent, then, the upbringing of American children will
depend upon leadership, teaching, and other sociological forces
beyond the control of both the Constitution and the laws more
generally. Still, it seems self-evident that children's well-being %Vill
depend substantially on whether the government devotes enough
resources to education,55 day care, and children's medical needs, and
on how the government regulates such matters as reproductive
freedom, divorce, and child support obligations.-' Insofar as that is
true, the government's treatment of schools and families will be an
important locus for research into the relationship between
constitutional interpretation and the good society.
V.
Constitutional theory is a practical discipline. In order to determine
how any country's constitution should be interpreted, maintained, and
reformed, we must make comparisons among real alternatives. If, for
example, we want to assess some feature of American constitutional
practice, we must identify other policies or procedures that might be
implemented in a diverse, large-scale, federal democracy with
American characteristics.? We accomplish nothing if we simply
lament the respects in which America might be deficient by
comparison to some imagined democratic utopia-such as a quasi-
mythical version of ancient Athens, filled with vigorous democratic
citizens who gather together in public spaces to deliberate respectfully
about matters of state (and who, it should be added, assign their
household chores to slaves), or a sanitized, somewhat nostalgic vision
of the United States itself just after World War II, when televisions
were rare and Americans were united by their shared commitment to
defeat the Axis powers (and when, it should be added, schools were
segregated and women were barred from many professions)."
(Stephen Macedo ed., N.Y. Univ. Press forthcoming 2001).
55. One of Putnam's most remarkable claims is that North Carolina could bring
its public schools up to Connecticut's (significantly better) standards if North Carolina
citizens were to "double their frequency of club meeting attendance," but that "it
would be virtually impossible [for North Carolinians] to achieve the same progress
simply by reducing class size." Putnam, supra note 13, at 301. If Putnam is correct,
then the correlation between educational quality and government spending might
turn out to be astonishingly small. On the other hand, Putnam himself seems to think
that much can be accomplished by reducing school size, rather than class size; his
rationale is that "more students in smaller schools have an opportunity to play
trombone or left tackle or King Lear." Id. at 405.
56. A controversial study by John Donohue and Steven Levitt, for example,
provides empirical evidence for the possibility that expansions in abortion rights, by
reducing the number of unwanted children, ill eventually produce, reductions in
crime rates. See Erica Goode, Linking Drop in Crime to Rise in Abortion, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 20, 1999, at A14 (discussing the study).
57. This point is an organizing theme of Eisgruber, supra note 29.
58. McClain and Fleming rightly complain that "some [civil society] revivalists
seem to engage in selective retrieval [of historical details], evidently assuming that
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Constitutional theory's practical character requires, among other
things, that we develop a lively sense of constitutionalism's limits-of
what we cannot realistically hope that constitutions will accomplish in
the United States or elsewhere. In this article, I have emphasized two
limitations relevant to civic virtue and the good society. First, because
a nation's laws must respect a pluralist conception of virtue, good
constitutions will inevitably leave citizens with considerable freedom
to live badly. Second, because constitutions must rely upon large-
scale elections to implement democracy, they will inevitably make
voting and tax-paying the most conspicuous elements of citizenship; as
a result, they will provide soft incentives for citizens to be selfish and
passive. If we keep these limits in mind, we can identify some modest,
but still important, connections between constitutional interpretation,
law, and the good society. If, on the other hand, we neglect the limits
of constitutionalism, there is a risk that we will damage or destroy
valuable constitutional rights in a well-intentioned quest to create
societal virtues that, no matter how noble or commendable, are simply
not achievable through constitutionalism or law.
th[e] history of exclusi[ve practices] was an unfortunate element.., that can be easily
removed ... and they fail to consider whether such a history seriously undermines the
very notion of a more virtuous past." McClain & Fleming, supra note 47, at 338-39.
See also Dorothy E. Roberts, The Moral Exclusivity of the New Civil Society, 75 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 555, 556 (2000) (discussing how civil society revivalists have "a
conception of civil society more concerned with rescuing a disappearing way of life
than with ending persistent economic and social disparities").
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